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COMMENT 
BUCKING THE TREND: WHY MARYLAND DOES NOT 
NEED AN EQUINE ACTIVITY STATUTE AND WHY IT MAY 
BE TIME TO PUT ALL OF THESE STATUTES OUT TO 
PASTURE 
By: Jennifer Dietrich Merryman 
There is substantial misconception among horsemen as to the 
protection afforded by equine activity statutes and whether these 
statutes currently have an effect on procuring insurance and reducing 
insurance rates. l Every few years, Maryland legislators introduce an 
equine limited liability bill in response to constituent pressure.2 The 
Maryland horse community is concerned with how best to protect and 
promote the local horse industry. Based on the horse industry's 
economic impact, these are admirable goals. This local industry has 
an annual economic impact of $1.5 billion, and employs over 20,000 
people.3 
Although the demand for horse related activities is high, so is the 
risk of injury to people. Horses weigh in excess of 1,000 pounds and 
can travel up to 35 miles per hour. Horses are unpredictable and as a 
herd animal, they are endowed with a very strong flight instinct that 
can be triggered at any moment. Needless to say, horse related 
injuries are often severe. 
An equine activity statute4 is designed to provide limited immunity 
to the horse professional and equine activity sponsors from lawsuits 
stemming from horse related injuries.5 Prior the establishment of 
comparative negligence theory, most states applied the common law 
1. E-mail from Crystal Brumme Kimball, Secretary, Maryland Steeple Chase Association to 
Jennifer Merryman (June 1,2005 12:44 P.M. EST) (on file with author). 
2. ld. 
3. Maryland Department of Agriculture, Maryland Horse Industry Board, 
http://www.marylandhorseindustry.org/pdffiles/CensusBrochure.pdf. See also 
http://www.horse council.org (holding that nationwide, the horse industry supports 1.4 
million jobs and pays over $2 billion in taxes). 
4. The author uses the terms equine limited liability statute and equine activity statute 
interchangeab Iy. 
5. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.540 (West 2005). 
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doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk6, both of 
which acted to protect the defendant from liability. Assumption of 
risk came into play when the plaintiff knowingly agreed to bear the 
responsibility of a certain risk or risks.7 Contributory negligence 
barred a plaintiff even when his or her injury was minuscule.8 
Eventually, most states changed to a comparative fault system because 
it was considered more equitable than the common law fault system 
that allowed for contributory negligence.9 To address the role 
assumption of risk played within a comparative negligence regime, 
high risk sports statutes, including equine statutes, were created to 
unequivocally establish assumption of risk in specific situations. lo 
However, it makes more sense to develop a sound framework of 
general tort principles instead of having various sport specific 
statutes. II A global view based on primary implied assumption of risk 
obviates the need for legislative re-establishment of assumption of 
risk. The utility of primary implied assumption of risk is that it does 
not require legislative bodies to foresee the myriad of activities in 
which a person may voluntarily and enthusiastically engage. Under 
such a system, a person who voluntarily participates in a recreational 
activity or sport should not be able to sue for being injured by a risk 
that cannot be eliminated from the sport. 
Part I of this comment will show the impetus behind equine activity 
statutes. Part II will show why the need for equine statutes no longer 
exists based on the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk. 
Lastly, Part III will survey Maryland law to show that Maryland will 
not benefit from an equine activity statute and therefore should not 
adopt one. 
6. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 1.01 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2002). 
7. Infra note 16. 
8. ld. 
9. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at §22.02, § 100. 
10. Infra note 14. 
11. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
207,208. 
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I. IMPETUS BEHIND EQUINE ACTIVITY STATUTES 
A. Common Law Assumption of Risk 
The high risk of injury and the change in tort law were the main 
driving forces behind equine protective statutes. 12 To understand why 
equine limited liability laws came about, it is important to understand 
how the evolution of fault systems l3 created a period of time when it 
was unclear whether assumption of risk survived as a complete 
defense. At the same time, many states had important economic 
industries that evolved around high risk activities where accidents 
were inevitable. 14 To provide immediate assistance to these industries, 
legislators .enacted statutes establishing protection for specific 
activities. 15 
Traditionally, there were two complete defenses to negligence, 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk, both of which acted to 
bar a plaintiff from recovery.16 Scholars advocated for a comparative 
negligence system for fairness reasons. In part, this view is premised 
on the theory of loss distribution as a way to mitigate the perceived 
harshness of contributory negligence. 17 Comparative negligence 
operates by apportioning the costs of negligent acts on the basis of 
fault. 18 In other words, using comparative negligence, the court 
12. Terence J. Centner, The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997,998, 1002 
(Summer 1995). 
13. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 (referring to fault systems as different laws that 
operate to find liability when a duty has been breached). 
14. John O. Spengler & Brian P. Burket, Sport Safety Statutes and Inherent Risk: A 
Comparison Study of Sport Specific Legislation, 11 J. LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT 135, 135 
(Spring/Summer 2001). 
15. Id.; see, e.g. Amburgey v. Sauder, 605 N.W.2d 84, 93 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
16. RICHARD 1. GILBERT & PAUL T. GILBERT, MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK § 11.4, 11.6 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 3rd ed. Lexis Publishing 2000) (1986). 
17. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6; 78 A.L.R 3d 339 § 2b (noting that comparative 
negligence system stresses equitable distribution of losses in relation to the contribution 
of the parties). Maryland is a common law state that recognizes contributory negligence 
as a complete bar. In theory, the defense seems quite harsh. "Contributory negligence 
bars recovery, theoretically at least, even though by comparison the negligence is 
minuscule. In theory, if the defendant's negligence is 99.99% of the total negligence 
comprising the incident, and the plaintiffs negligence is .01 %, the plaintiff is not, as a 
matter of law, entitled to recover." MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 16 at § 11.4.1. 
However, comments to the Maryland Jury Instructions suggest a more moderate 
approach. For example, using the "more likely than not" standard when assessing 
whether the plaintiffs contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his harm and 
not allowing a jury instruction if the evidence amounts to nothing more than conjecture. 
MD. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 19:11 cmt. 3(b)-(c) (2003). 
18. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 2.01. 
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divides up the damages between the parties when the plaintiffs 
negligence has contributed to his injury.19 Therefore, in a comparative 
negligence regime, a plaintiffs contributory negligence ceases to act 
as a complete bar. Unfortunately, many of the peripheral issues 
surrounding comparative negligence were not framed; in fact, it was 
unclear whether assumption of risk survived a comparative negligence 
regime.20 The argument used to support this position hinged on the 
idea that a system designed to distribute losses cannot allow an 
absolute defense that precludes such losses from being distributed.21 
In the 1950's, a few states began changing to a comparative 
negligence fault system?2 Between the 1960's and the 1970's, the 
adoption of comparative fault by statute and judicial fiat surged.23 By 
1980, implied assumption of risk was virtually extinct.24 This was 
also an era of continuous expansion in tort liability theories in almost 
every area of tort law.25 Accordingly, the professional horseman 
began to see an increase in insurance premiums and, in some 
instances, the inability to procure insurance at al1.26 
Although dividing damages based on fault assignments is equitable 
in theory, it can assign fault to a defendant for risks that are an integral 
part of a sport.27 This is especially unfair when part of the attraction to 
the sport is the risk itself. Therefore, even when an injurious outcome 
is a collateral and customarily accepted facet of an activity, many 
states lost the ability to deal with such cases as a matter of law.28 
Instead, assumption of risk became one of the factors when 
apportioning fault. 29 By the mid-1980's, the legal community began to 
recognize the moderating effect that common law assumption of risk 
has on law suits, particularly with regard to sports and other 
recreational activities.3o 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at § 9.01 et seq. 
21. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 68, 456-57 (4th ed. 1971). 
22. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 1.0 I. 
23. ld. 
24. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American 
Tort, 26 GA. L. REV. 601,671 (Spring 1992). 
25. Id. at 604 (suggesting there is a slow down recently, but it may be only a pause in what 
could turn out to be a continuing rise in liability). 
26. See Amburgey, supra note 15 at 93; see Centner, supra note 12 at 999. 
27. But see Donald v. Triple SWell Serv., 708 So.2d 1318, 1325 (Miss. 1998) (noting a jury 
may find 0% fault on causation). 
28. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at §§ 9.0 I (a)-9.04(a)(l), (b), (c). 
29. !d. at § 9.04(b), (c)(3). 
30. Ordway v. Superior Court of Orange County, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); 
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986). 
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There are many sports besides equestrian activities that have sport 
specific limited liability statutes, for example, hockey, baseball, 
outfitters, and skiing to name a few.3l But if many comparative 
negligence states recognize the no-duty theory of primary implied 
assumption of risk,32 then it appears that these statutes, while once 
probably necessary, have outlived their usefulness. Additionally, most 
jurisdictions recognize a heightened standard of care when it comes to 
personal injury resulting from voluntary participation in recreational 
activities.33 This means that the defendant's simple negligence or 
carelessness is not enough to attach liability. The negligence must 
reach a recklessness or gross standard.34 This further bolsters the idea 
that the need for these types of sport specific statutes may be over. 
If the legislatures and lobbyists, insist on these types of statutes, 
perhaps an omnibus recreational statute addressing sports and 
recreational activities in general would be more appropriate. But 
whether or not such a statute would provide better protection for the 
organizers and providers of recreational activities is debatable. For 
example, an omnibus statute, including a general provision and sport 
specific subsections containing comprehensive lists of the inherent 
risks in each sport, raises the question of how realistic is it to outline 
every single risk or contingency.35 Alternatively, if the omnibus sports 
statute only has a general provision for inherent risks, the judge would 
make a determination, based on the facts of the case, whether or not 
31. Terence J. Centner, ModifYing Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New 
Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 ARK. L. REV. 637, 642 
(1998). 
32. See, e.g. Howell v. Clyde, 620 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Pa. 1993); Stanton v. Miller, 583 
N.E.2d 1080, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing no-duty theory but distinguishing 
primary assumption of risk from implied assumption of risk); Chapman v. Craig, 431 
N.W.2d 770, 771 (Iowa 1988) (referring only to primary assumption of risk). See 
Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in Sports and 
Recreation Cases, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 583, 590, (Winter, 
2002). 
33. Kelly v. Mccarrick, 155 Md. 82, 101, 841 A.2d 869, 880 (2004) (citing Stanley L. 
Grazis, Liability of Participant in Team Athletic Competition for Injury to or Death of 
Another Participant, 55 A.L.R. 5th 529, *2 (1998 2003 Supp.); Crawn v. Campo, 643 
A.2d 600, 603 (citing Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 716 (Cal. 1992))). 
34. Knight, at 716 (citing Southwest Key Program, Inc. v. Gil-Perez, 81 S.W.3d 269, 271 
(Tex. 2002)). 
35. Inherent risks are risks that are either integral to the sport or risks that simply exist, for 
example falling rocks, etc. Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent 
Risks: Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act-An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 249, at 
§ V(B) (1998). Knight, 834 P.2d at 708(stating that the careless conduct of others can be 
an inherent risk, for example a player being hit by a carelessly thrown baseball). 
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the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. In other words, the judge is 
right back at cornmon law primary implied assumption of risk. 
II. PRIMARY IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK 
Assumption of risk is a complicated concept because courts have 
used the term in different situations using various analytical 
concepts.36 The Restatement Second of Torts describes at least four 
different ways the doctrine is used.37 However, in general, assumption 
of risk occurs when the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly assumes 
responsibility for any mishaps resulting from the activity he or she is 
engaged in at the time of the injury. Assumption of risk is expressed 
or implied. Express assumption of risk means the plaintiff expressly 
agrees not to hold the defendant responsible in the event of an injury.38 
For example, a defendant may ask plaintiff to sign a consent form or 
waiver. Implied assumption of risk occurs when, based on the 
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff tacitly 
agrees to assume a known risk and thus relieves the defendant from 
liability.39 An example is sports and recreational activities which 
involve some risks that cannot be eliminated with reasonable care.40 
36. See, e.g. 57A AM. JUR. 20 Negligence et seq. (2004). 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. c(l)-c(4) (1965). 
c I. In its simplest fonn, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff has 
given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation to 
exercise care for his protection, and agrees to take his chances as to injury 
fonna known or possible risk. The result is that the defendant, who would 
otherwise be under a duty to exercise such care, is relieved of that 
responsibility, and is no longer under any duty to protect the plaintiff. 
c2. A second, and closely related, meaning is that the plaintiff has 
entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows 
to involve risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to 
relieve the defendant of responsibility, and to take his own chances ... 
c3. In a third type of situation the plaintiff, aware of a risk created by 
the negligence of the defendant, proceeds or continues voluntarily to 
encounter it. .. 
c4 .... The plaintiffs conduct in voluntarily encountering a known 
risk is itself unreasonable, and amounts to contributory negligence. There 
is thus negligence on both plaintiff and defendant, and plaintiff is barred 
from recovery, not only by his implied consent to accept the risk, but also 
by the policy of the law which refuses to allow him to impose upon the 
defendant a loss for which his own negligence was in part responsible. 
38. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 9.02. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 496B cmt. B (1965) (stating that assumption of risk is usually written, however, other 
fonns of consent may be sufficient). 
39. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6 at § 9.01; see also Drago, supra note 31. 
40. Drago, supra note 31. 
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Therefore, courts in comparative negligence states began to reinstate 
the defense of implied assumption of risk by dividing it further into 
two subcategories: primary implied assumption of risk and secondary 
implied assumption ofrisk.41 
Under the doctrine of primary implied assumption of risk, a defendant 
does not have a duty to the Elaintiff. Therefore, the defendant's 
negligence is not examined. 2 Thus, it survives comparative 
negligence and remains a complete bar to a lawsuit.43 The defendant 
merely has a limited duty towards the plaintiff to not increase the 
inherent risks of the sport.44 The public policy behind this concept is 
recognition of inherent risks45 and the important role recreational 
activities play in society.46 For example, moguls on a ski slope pose a 
unique risk of injury to skiers that would not exist if they were 
removed. However, the risks posed by the moguls are part of the sport 
of skiing and the ski resort operators have no duty to remove them.47 
So even if a novice skier, with no knowledge or appreciation of the 
risk of moguls, becomes injured as a result of skiing over them, the ski 
resort operators are not liable.48 In this regard, an analysis of primary 
implied assumption of risk will be unique to every sport or 
recreational activity49 allowing for flexibility as new sports and 
activities evolve. 
Secondary implied assumption of risk occurs when the defendant 
has a duty to the plaintiff but the plaintiff acts unreasonably in 
voluntarily accepting the risk created by the defendant's breach of that 
dUty.50 Therefore, the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct constitutes 
41. Kelly, 155 Md. at 95,841 A.2d at 876; Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 641, 751 
A.2d 481, 488 (2000) (stating Maryland has not adopted this distinction). Some courts 
call this reasonable primary implied assumption of risk, or no-duty rule, and 
unreasonable (secondary) implied assumption of risk. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703 
(distinguishing between unreasonablelreasonab1e and primary/secondary); Turcotte, 502 
N.E.2d at 968. However, some courts refer to express assumption of risk as primary 
assumption of risk. This is possibly because express assumption of risk involves analysis 
of whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703. 
42. Kelly, 155 Md. at 95, 841 A.2d at 876; Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d at 968; Mark W. Milam, 
Assumption of Risk in Tennessee Subsequent to the Adoption of Comparative Fault: 
Perez v. McConkey, 60 TENN. L. REv. 1007, 1012 (Summer 1993). 
43. Id.; Crews, 358 Md. at 640, 751 A.2d at 488. 
44. See Kelly, 155 Md. at 104, 841 A.2d at 882. 
45. Id. (identifying inherent risks as those that are integral to the sport, game, or recreational 
activity). 
46. Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 1994). 
47. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Kelly, 155 Md. at 95, 841 A.2d at 876; see also Crews, 358 Md. at 641, 751 A.2d at 488. 
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contributory negligence.5! In a comparative fault regime, this does not 
survive as a complete defense. 52 Instead, the plaintiff s conduct is 
submitted to the jury for consideration in reducing damages incurred 
from the defendant's breach. 53 
A. Equine Activity Statutes 
Equine activity statutes first emerged in the late 1980's, at a time 
when the question of whether assumption of risk as a defense was still 
being settled. 54 Economic factors appear to have been one of the main 
motivations behind high risk sport statutes.55 As more and more states 
adopted these statutes, there may have been a stabilizing affect on 
insurance costs. Across the nation, insurance rates are determined by 
nationwide averages and cost calculations. 56 Under these 
circumstances the statutes make sense, as the real value was to clearly 
broadcast that personal responsibility was a cannon that had not been 
marginalized. Given the rise in states choosing comparative 
negligence fault systems and the fact that insurance rates were at an all 
time high with implied assumption of risk non-existent, the statutes 
circumvented the confusion over assumption of risk. 57 Having equine 
statutes in place would have helped the professional horseman at the 
time. 
However, the protection provided to horse communities from 
equine statutes is somewhat variable. The language of each statute has 
an impact on the scope of immunity provided. Therefore, a defendant 
horseman goes to trial if the judge determines that the equine statute 
does not apply to him or her. For instance, some equine statutes 
51. Drago, supra note 31 at 604-05. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. See id. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.540. 
55. See, e.g. supra note 35 at 251. 
56 E-mail from Christopher Heavrin, Agricultural Underwriter, AFIS to Jennifer Merryman 
(April 20, 200611:12 A.M. EST) (on file with author). 
57 All states have comparative negligence fault systems except Alabama, District of 
Columbia, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia. Ala. Power Co. v. Schultz, 215 
So.2d 447, 452 (Ala. 1968); Wingfield v. People's Drug Store, 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 
1994); Bd. of County Comm'r of Garrett County v. Bell Atl., 346 Md. 160, 180, 695 
A.2d 171, 181 (1997); Baskett v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1947). See ALA. TORT 
LAW, § 2.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 2004); MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 
16 at § 11.4; N.C. LAW OF TORTS, § 16 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 2004); PERSONAL 
INJURY LAW IN VA., § 5.1.1 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 2004); D.C. CN. JURY INSTR. § 
5.15 (2004). 
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preclude spectators of equine events from bringing forth a lawsuit for 
personal injuries sustained by a horse, while others do not. 58 
Under primary implied assumption of risk, it is not necessary to 
foresee the specific risk that a spectator or participant may encounter 
at an equine event. Instead, it is only necessary for the judge to 
decide, based on the facts, if the risk was inherent to being in close 
proximity to horses. 
The scope of protection provided by statute versus that provided by 
common law is illustrated in Freidli v. Kerr. 59 The plaintiffs were 
passengers in a horse drawn carriage.60 The horse spooked from a 
loud noise and eventually broke free from the carriage despite the 
coachman's efforts.61 As a result, the carriage overturned injuring the 
occupants.62 The judge determined that the state equine statute did not 
provide immunity as a matter of law to the defendant carriage owners 
because the passengers were not participants of an equine activity and 
the carriage owners were not providers of an equine activity.63 
Analyzing the unique facts of this case under primary implied 
assumption of risk might yield a different outcome. The judge would 
determine if a trained carriage horse which became frightened by a 
loud crack or popping noise is a risk inherent in a carriage ride in the 
streets of an urban area. If the risk is one that cannot be eliminated 
despite reasonable efforts to do so, then the risk is inherent and no 
duty exists on behalf of the defendants. 
III. MARYLAND LAW 
Maryland does not recognize primary implied assumption of risk 
because the defense of assumption of risk was never abandoned. 64 
Therefore, the cases do not tum on an in depth analysis of the 
defendant's duty by the court. Instead, the focus is on whether or not 
the plaintiff abandons his or her right to complain through voluntary 
exposure to known risks. Additionally, in a common law state, such 
58. See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-20-101 to 44-20-104; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2305.321(B)(1). 
59. Friedli v. Kerr, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 108 (2001). 
60. Id. at 1. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 4-5. 
64. MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK supra note 16 at § 11.6; see, e.g. Kelly, 155 Md. at 93, 841 
A.2d at 875. 
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as Maryland, adopting an equine statute designed to reinstate common 
law defenses is unnecessary and a waste of legislative resources. 
To date, forty-four other states have passed equine statutes.65 
Interestingly, even though some states have not relinquished the 
common law defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of 
risk, they nevertheless enacted equine statutes. Alabama, North 
Carolina, and Virginia, like Maryland, never adopted a comparative 
fault regime.66 As mentioned previously, one possible explanation for 
65. ALA. CODE § 6-5-337 (Westlaw current through End of 2004 First Spec. Sess.); ARIZ. 
REV. ANN. § 12-533 (Westlaw current through May 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120-
201 (Westlaw current through November 2004); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-119 
(Westlaw current through chapter 153 of the First Reg. Sess. 65th Reg. Sess.); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557p (Westlaw current through Jan. 2005 Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 8140 (Westlaw current through the First Reg. Sess. 2005); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 773.01-.05 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. 4-
12-1 (Westlaw current through end of 2004 First Spec. Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. 663B-I 
(Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE 6-1801 (Westlaw current 
through 2004 Sess.); 745 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 47/1-47/999 (Westlaw current through 
2005 Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. 34-4-44-1 to 34-4-44-12 (Westlaw current through 
2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 673.1 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. 60-4001 to 60-4004 (Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); Ky. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 247.401 (Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. 
9:2795.1 (Westlaw current through 2004 First Extraordinary Sess. 2004); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. TIT. 7, 4102-4103 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.)(noting this 
statute has been repealed); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, 2D (Westlaw current through 
2005 First Annual Sess.); MICH. COMPo LAWS 691.1661 (Westlaw current through 2005); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. 604A.12 (Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE 
ANN. 95-11-1 to 95-11-7 (Westlaw current through 2004 Third Extraordinary Sess.); Mo. 
ANN. STAT. 537.325 (Westlaw current through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. 
27-1-725 to 27-1-727 (Westlaw current 2003 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
21,249 (Westlaw current through 2004 Second Reg. Sess.); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
508:19 (Westlaw current through 2004 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:15-1 (Westlaw 
current through 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. 42-13-1 to 42-13-5 (Westlaw current through 
2005 First Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-I (Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. 
Sess.); N.D. CENT CODE 53-10-01 to 53-10-02 (Westlaw current through 2003 Gen & 
Special Sess.); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 2305.321 (Westlaw current through 2005); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 76 § 50.1 (Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OR. REv. STAT. 
30.687-.697 (Westlaw current through 2003 Reg. Sess.); R.l. GEN. LAWS 4-21-1 to 4-21-4 
(Westlaw current through 2004); S.c. CODE ANN. 47-9-710 (Westlaw current through 
2004 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 42-11-1 to 42-11-5 (Westlaw current 
through 2005 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. 44-20-101 to 44-20-105 (Westlaw current 
through 2005 First Reg. Sess.); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 87.001-.005 
(Westlaw current through 2005 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-27b-101 to 78-27b-102 
(Westlaw current through 2004 Gen. Election); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.l2 § 27.1039 
(Westlaw current through 2004); Va. Code Ann. 3.1-796.130-.133 (Westlaw current 
through 2005 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 4.24.530-.540 (West law current 
through 2005); W. VA. CODE 20-4-1 to 20-4-7 (Westlaw current through 2005); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. 895.481 (Westlaw current through 2005); WYO. STAT. 1-1-121 to 1-1-123 
(Westlaw current through 2004). To date, Maine's equine statute has been repealed. 
66. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-337; N.c. GEN. STAT. § 99E-I; VA. CODE ANN. 3.1 796.130-.133 
(listing the non-comparative negligence states other than Maryland). Violation of an 
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the adoption of equine statutes in these states is the nature of the 
insurance industry and how premiums are calculated and determined. 
However, that initial stabilization appears to be over. According to 
Markel Insurance, the rates in Virginia, North Carolina, and Alabama, 
have not been affected by their equine statutes. 67 In fact, the rates in 
those states are comparable to the rates Marylanders pay.68 Thus, if 
Maryland were to enact an equine statute, the local horse community 
could not expect to see a reduction in insurance premiums. 
Another reason for equine limited liability statute popularity among 
horsemen is the misguided perception that equine statutes afford better 
protection than the common law. 69 These statutes are modeled after 
the common law, so this belief is simply unfounded.7o A brief survey 
of Maryland law indicates that Maryland's common law provides 
ample protection to the local horsemen. 
While all equine limited liability statutes are designed to support 
the horse community by limiting liability from the inherent risks 
associated with horse activities, they are not intended to absolve 
defendants from all liability.7] Generally, mishaps that involve non-
equine statute may allow a defendant to bring forth the defense of contributory 
negligence when the plaintiff's action warrants such a defense. The defense of 
contributory negligence may become unavailable when the defendant has violated a 
statute when the statute expressly states so or the statute was enacted to protect a specific 
class of persons and the legislature intended for the defendant to be responsible. Equine 
statutes are directed to the public at large and do not contain this express language and 
thus do not fall into one of these exceptions. See also O'Neill v. Windshire-Copeland 
Assoc., 595 S.E.2d 281, 284-85 (2004); Brower v. Robert Chappell & Assoc., 328 
S.E.2d 45, 47 (1985); Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 554, 831 A.2d 6, 10 
(2003) (stating in Maryland, violation of a statute, even if the language of the statute is 
mandatory, is merely evidence of negligence and a defendant may bring forth the defense 
of contributory negligence unless the statute expressly states the contrary). 
67. See e-mail from Christopher Heavrin supra note 57. 
68. ld. 
69. Horse lntereste Seek Lawsuit Shield, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, July 28, 1997, at B2 
(citing fear of possible lawsuits as another reason for support of the statute). 
70. Krystyna M. Carmal, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Discussion of Those in 
Existence and Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 Ky. LJ. 157, 166-67 (1994). 
71. See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. 44-20-104(b)(I)-(4): 
(b) Nothing in 44-20-103 shall prevent or limit the liability of an equine 
activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person if the equine 
activity sponsor, equine professional, or person: 
(1) (A) Provided the equipment or tack, and knew or should have known that 
the equipment or tack was faulty, and such equipment or tack was faulty to 
the extent that it did cause the injury; or 
(B) Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to 
determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity 
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inherent risks fall outside of the statute.72 For example, faulty tack or 
equipment, failing to supply an appropriate mount (also called 
negligent mismatch), intentional torts, and latent defects on the land, 
may allow the plaintiff to prevail. 
A. Inherent Risk and Public Policy in Maryland 
A recent case illustrates the desire by the Maryland judiciary to 
maintain the ability for individuals to continue to pursue and enjoy 
sporting activities by ensuring that those who provide for such 
opportunities are not unreasonably exposed to litigation. In Kelly v. 
Mccarrick, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland decided whether 
the Catholic Youth Organization League was negligently responsible 
for the severe ankle injury of a thirteen-year-old softball player 
sustained in a slide-tagout play.73 The Court opined that a voluntary 
participant in a sport assumes all risks that are an integral part of that 
sport,74 stating that: 
As a matter of policy, it would not be appropriate to 
recognize a duty of care when to do so would require 
that an integral part of the sport be abandoned, or 
would discourage vigorous participation in sporting 
events. Accordingly defendants generally do not have a 
duty to protect the plaintiff from the risks inherent in 
h 75 t e sport ... 
B. Negligently Faulty Tack 
Many equine statutes impose a duty on the professional horseman 
to supply serviceable tack to a rider. 76 Tack is equipment used in 
and detennine the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular 
equine based on the participant's representations of the participant's ability; 
(2) Owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and control of the 
land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a 
dangerous latent condition which was known to the equine activity sponsor, 
equine professional, or person and for which warning signs have not been 
conspicuously posted; 
(3) Commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for 
the safety of the participant, and that act or omission caused the injury; or 
(4) Intentionally injures the participant. 
72. /d., Centner, supra note 12 at 1018; Cannal, supra note 73 at 173. 
73. Kelly, 155 Md. at 88-89,841 A.2d at 871-72. 
74. Id. at 96-97,841 A.2d at 877. 
75. Id. 155 Md. at 104,841 A.2d at 882. 
76. See, e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. 44-20-104 (b)(I)(A) (listing non-inherent risks). 
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riding horses, such as saddles, bridles, reins etc. The equipment is 
usually leather and requires maintenance to prevent dry rot which may 
cause the equipment to break while in use. Maryland also recognizes 
that this may be a cause of action in negligence. 77 In Pahanish v. 
Western Trails, Inc., the plaintiff rented horses from the defendant for 
a guided trail ride.7s During the trail ride, one of the horses kicked the 
horse the plaintiff was riding, causing it to rear Up.79 As a result, the 
plaintiff and the saddle fell. so One of the arguments advanced by the 
plaintiff was negligent faulty equipment.S! Although the Court of 
Special Appeals found no direct evidence to show that the defendant 
had been alerted to the possibility of a defective saddle, by 
implication, when the evidence is such to support a negligent faulty 
tack cause of action, a defendant may be liable.82 
C. Negligent Mismatch 
Another exception to many equine statutes is the requirement that a 
horse professional make inquiries into the rider's abilities and select an 
equine partner that is complimentary.s3 Although there are no cases 
on point involving horses, Maryland acknowledges that in sports 
generally, part of a coach's or sponsor's responsibilities is not to pit 
players of disparate size and skill against each other.84 This stated 
policy, together with the repeated admonishing of other jurisdictions 
indicating that the equine provider must act reasonably in selecting a 
horse to be ridden, suggests that Maryland law is harmonious with 
those states with equine statues that consider negligent mismatching a 
non-inherent risk to a rider. 
77. Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md. 342, 517 A.2d 1122 (1986). 
78. Id. at 355, 5 I 7 A.2d at 1128. 
79. Id. at351,517 A.2dat 1126. 
80. Id. 
8!. Id. at 363, 517 A.2dat 1132. 
82. See Cooperman v. Wyoming Rivers & Trails, 214 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(noting the slipping of a saddle due to a loose cinch was an inherent risk of horse back 
riding absent evidence to the contrary); Easterling v. English Point Riding Stables, Inc., 
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3470, 3-4 (holding that Summary Judgment was not appropriate 
because there was an issue of fact regarding whether the martingale used during the 
riding lesson broke as a result of it being faulty). 
83. Hendricks v. JAFI, Inc., 1999 WL 1336069 (Mass. 1999); Willeck v. Mrotek, Inc., 616 
N.W.2d 526, (unreported). 
84. Kelly, 155 Md. at 115,841 A.2d at 888. 
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D. Landowner Liability 
Maryland has long held that landowners have a duty to business 
invitees to use ordinary and reasonable care to safely maintain their 
premises.85 However, this is balanced by the idea that landowners are 
not insurers of safety to their business invitees.86 In addition, what is 
reasonable and ordinary will differ from circumstance to 
circumstance.87 In Maryland v. Thurston, the plaintiff, a race horse 
owner, brought his horse to the track near Fair Hill training complex.88 
While the rider was exercising the horse around the track, it suddenly 
veered into a large gap between the rail and the infield of the track.89 
As a result, the horse struck the end of the rail and was impaled by a 
metal rod.9o The Maryland Court of Special Appeals stated the 
Department of Natural Resources had an obligation to exercise 
ordinary care to maintain the premises and to warn of concealed 
dangers that may not be obvious to the business invitee.91 However, a 
forty foot gap in the continuous white rail, directly across the entrance 
to the track, was obvious and therefore it was not a latent defect that 
required any warning by the landowner.92 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The goals of equine statutes are to support the horse industry by 
providing a statutory exception to assumption of risk. However, most 
jurisdictions currently acknowledge a heightened standard of care with 
regard to personal injuries incurred from voluntary participation in 
recreational activities and sportS.93 Additionally, many jurisdictions 
also recognize primary implied assumption of risk. It appears that 
comparative negligence states are coming full circle back to common 
law basic principles, a place Maryland never left. ,Maryland legislators 
are to be commended for their interest in meeting the local horse 
community's needs. However, the local horse community's efforts 
85. MD. TORT LAW HANDBOOK supra note 16 at § 11.3 (stating that the duty a landowner 
owes is based on the status of the person entering the landowner's property). 
86. Md. State Fair & Agric. Soc'y v. Lee, 29 Md. 374, 378, 348 A.2d 44, 47 (1975). 
87. Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636, 640 A.2d 1134, 1135 (1994). 
88. Maryland v. Thurston, 128 Md. 656, 661, 739 A.2d 940, 943 (1999). 
89. Jd. at 660, 739 A.2d at 942. 
90. Jd. 
91. Id. at 661,739 A.2d at 943. 
92. Jd. at 661-62, 739 A.2d at 943. 
93. Kelly, 155 Md. at 101,841 A.2d at 880. 
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should be refocused from lobbying legislators to enact unnecessary 
statutes, to educating the community about the current protections and 
responsibilities that stem from the common law. "The best way to 
learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general 
rules.,,94 The reality is Maryland's horsemen have nothing to gain 
from such a statute, neither a decrease in insurance nor better 
protection than the common law already offers. 
94. Easterbrook, supra note 11 at 207. 
